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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Michael Wesley Whitmer II appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence 
for possession of a counterfeit security, forging a passport, identity fraud, aggravated 
identity theft, and destruction of physical evidence.  He alleges that his guilty plea was 
invalid, the government breached its plea agreement, his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance, and his grand jury considered false information.  Whitmer further contends 
that the District Court failed to adequately address his request to proceed pro se, used an 
incorrect calculation of the sentencing guidelines, impaired his right of allocution, and 
added an impermissible special condition of supervised release relating to mental health 
treatment.  For the reasons stated below, we will affirm in part and remove the mental 
health condition. 
I. 
 We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis. 
On January 22, 2007, Whitmer presented a counterfeit American Express 
traveler’s cheque in order to purchase a $100 ticket at the Kimmel Center in Philadelphia.  
Whitmer then attempted to have the ticket refunded for cash.  At the time of the purchase, 
Whitmer presented an altered British passport (which had been validly issued to another 
person) under the name “Mark Prim.”  Whitmer was arrested the next day in a hotel 
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room, where police found a laptop, printer, and other materials used to reproduce the 
same traveler’s cheque.  After he was arrested, Whitmer was observed trying to alter his 
fingerprints. 
 Further investigation revealed that Whitmer had used the same traveler’s cheque 
58 times before his arrest, using a number of different identities and names.  He had also 
stolen a number of credit cards. 
 Whitmer was charged with possessing a counterfeit security in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 513 (count one), forgery of a passport in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1543 (count 
two), identity fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(2) (count three), aggravated 
identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (count four), and destruction of physical 
evidence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (count five).  Although Whitmer was 
represented by counsel at the beginning of the prosecution, he filed a number of pro se 
pleadings, and his first assigned counsel eventually withdrew and was replaced. 
 Whitmer entered a guilty plea to all charges on April 9, 2009, pursuant to a plea 
agreement.  The agreement included a provision barring Whitmer from appealing or 
collaterally challenging his conviction or sentence under most circumstances.  Whitmer 
was placed under pre-trial supervision and released to the Fresh Start Recovery House in 
Philadelphia.  A few days before the sentencing hearing, Whitmer left the Recovery 
House without authorization, and the District Court issued a bench warrant for his arrest.  
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Police in Columbus, Ohio later arrested Whitmer and found stolen passports and other 
documents on his person. 
Whitmer was returned to custody, and his counsel was allowed to withdraw.  He 
represented himself at his May 6, 2010 sentencing hearing.  The parties agreed to 
recommend a sentence at the low end of a stipulated guideline range of 28 to 34 months.  
The Probation Office later determined that this stipulated range was incorrect, and 
calculated a new range of 70 to 81 months.  The District Court adopted the guideline 
recommendations contained in the presentence report and imposed a sentence of 81 
months of imprisonment:  57 months each for counts one, two, three and five, running 
concurrently, and 24 months for count four, to be served consecutively.  Whitmer appeals 
from that decision. 
II. 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We 
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
III. 
 Whitmer alleges numerous errors on appeal which, he submits, compel us to 
reverse the conviction, remand for an evidentiary hearing, and allow for the withdrawal 
of his previous guilty plea.  We conclude, based on the analysis below, that the only relief 
to which Whitmer is entitled is the removal of the mental health related special condition 
of release. 
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A. 
 Whitmer contends that his previous guilty plea is invalid because the government 
did not state a sufficient factual basis to support his guilty plea on counts three, four, and 
five.  Ordinarily, we review the District Court’s finding of a factual basis for a plea for 
abuse of discretion.  United States v. Cefaratti, 221 F.3d 502, 509 (3d Cir. 2000).  
Because Whitmer raises this objection for the first time on appeal,1
 “Before entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must determine that there is 
a factual basis for the plea.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3).  The court may make this 
determination based on “whatever means is appropriate in a specific case,” including the 
 we review for plain 
error.  Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134-35 (2009).  Under this standard, we 
have the discretion to provide a remedy only when the error:  “(1) constitutes a 
[d]eviation from a legal rule; (2) is clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable 
dispute; (3) affect[s] the appellant's substantial rights; and (4) seriously affect[s] the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  United States v. Dahmen, 
675 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
                                              
1 Whitmer maintains that he preserved these issues before the District Court in his 
May 5, 2010 motion.  That document states that parts of the presentence report are “false, 
misleading, or unduly prejudicial.”  To the extent the paragraphs Whitmer lists reference 
the facts underlying counts three, four, and five, the motion remains insufficient to 
preserve the issue for appeal.  See United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 728 (3d Cir. 
2010) (“A fleeting reference or vague allusion to an issue will not suffice to preserve it 
for appeal[.]”). 
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defendant’s admissions, the presentence report, and the government’s proffer of 
evidence.  Cefaratti, 221 F.3d at 509. 
 With regard to count three (identity fraud), Whitmer contends that the government 
did not provide evidence to establish a “transfer” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(2), 
which criminalizes knowingly transferring a false identification document.  Because the 
prosecutor told the District Court that Whitmer had given the passport to a Kimmel 
Center employee as part of a ticket purchase, the Rule 11(b)(3) standard is satisfied as to 
this count. 
 Whitmer also contends that there was there was no factual basis for his plea of 
guilty to count four (aggravated identity theft), which requires that the defendant 
knowingly used identification that actually belonged to another real person.  Because the 
prosecutor told the District Court the passport Whitmer had altered to include his picture 
and alias actually belonged to a British citizen, this argument has no merit.  The alteration 
to include Whitmer’s photo, along with the other real, fraudulently obtained identifying 
documents found on his person when he was apprehended in Columbus, provide 
sufficient facts on which the District Court could rely. 
 Finally, Whitmer argues that the District Court lacked a sufficient factual basis 
regarding count five (destruction of physical evidence) because no facts were presented 
to support a nexus between Whitmer’s attempt to destroy his own fingerprints and a 
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federal matter.  This argument fails because there is no “federal nexus requirement.”  See 
United States v. Moyer, 674 F.3d 192, 209 (3d Cir. 2012). 
Whitmer correctly points out a discrepancy between the plea agreement and the 
superseding indictment and presentencing report.  The plea agreement (as well as the 
government’s references to that agreement at hearings throughout the case) refers to 
count five as destruction of physical evidence in a federal investigation.  Supp. App. at 
114.  The presentence report, Supp. App. at 14 (adopted by the District Court without 
change), adds the language “and aiding and abetting,” which was included in the 
superseding indictment, Supp. App. at 39.  This error, and the resulting lack of factual 
support at sentencing for the aiding and abetting averment, did not ultimately impact 
Whitmer’s substantial rights.  In the presentence report, the Probation Office notes that 
count five was calculated as a +2 level adjustment for obstruction of justice pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.  This is the same adjustment Whitmer would have received had the 
aiding and abetting language not been included in the report’s initial description of count 
five.  No other reference to aiding and abetting was made throughout the sentencing 
proceeding. 
For these reasons, we conclude that the District Court did not commit plain error 
when it found that Whitmer had entered a valid guilty plea supported by sufficient facts. 
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B. 
 In his second claim, Whitmer argues for the first time on appeal2
“[W]hen a defendant waits until his appeal to allege a violation of his plea 
agreement, our authority to remedy the alleged error is strictly circumscribed.”  Dahmen, 
675 F.3d at 247-48 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  We review such 
claims for plain error, and have the discretion to provide a remedy only when the error:  
“(1) constitutes a [d]eviation from a legal rule; (2) is clear or obvious, rather than subject 
to reasonable dispute; (3) affect[s] the appellant's substantial rights; and (4) seriously 
affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  “The defendant whose plea agreement has been 
broken by the Government will not always be able to show prejudice, either because he 
obtained the benefits contemplated by the deal anyway . . . or because he likely would not 
have obtained those benefits in any event.”  Puckett, 556 U.S. at 141-42. 
 that the 
government breached the plea agreement, and as such he should be able to withdraw the 
agreement.  We disagree. 
Here, Whitmer alleges that the government violated its agreement in four ways:  
impermissibly suggesting in its sentencing memorandum that the guideline range 
                                              
2 Whitmer maintains that he preserved these issues for appeal by telling the 
District Court that he did not get “the benefit of the bargain,” that he “would be appealing 
this case,” and that he planned to file “a rule 35 motion.”  These statements are 
insufficient because none of these statements “unequivocally put [Whitmer’s] position 
before the trial court at a point and in a manner that permits the court to consider its 
merits.”  Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. United States, 182 F.3d 212, 218 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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suggested by the Probation Office (which was higher than the stipulated range in the 
agreement) would be appropriate, opposing credit for acceptance of responsibility, failing 
to correct factual inaccuracies in the presentence report, and moving to enforce the 
appellate waiver.  While the government concedes the sentencing memorandum made 
statements inconsistent with the plea agreement, we are persuaded that the memorandum 
did not prejudice Whitmer.  The District Court made clear at the sentencing hearing that 
it understood that the parties had agreed to a lower stipulation, that the government could 
not argue in favor of another range at the hearing, and that the sentencing court was not 
bound by those stipulations.  Furthermore, Whitmer concedes that the District Court 
based its decision on the revised guideline calculation from the Probation Office, which 
accounted for Whitmer’s misconduct since the time of the original report – a change that 
underscores the fact that the government’s memorandum was not likely the reason he did 
not receive the sentence outlined in the plea agreement.  See Appellant Rep. Br. at 24. 
As for the other breaches Whitmer alleges, the record of the sentencing hearing 
makes clear that the District Court heard and, where appropriate, made the factual 
changes Whitmer requested.  The government’s decision to invoke the appellate waiver 
here does not violate the plea agreement.  Because the plea agreement specifically limited 
the parties’ stipulation that Whitmer qualified for the downward adjustment for 
acceptance of responsibility with the language “as of the date of the agreement,” the 
government was free to argue that Whitmer’s later actions were inconsistent with such an 
  
10 
adjustment.  See Supp. App. at 116.  For these reasons, we conclude that Whitmer has not 
established a breach of the plea bargain meriting relief. 
C. 
 In his third claim, Whitmer argues that his counsel was ineffective.  We conclude 
that this claim is not properly considered as part of this direct appeal. 
 Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are generally reserved for collateral 
proceedings, which are better equipped to develop the record needed to evaluate these 
claims.  United States v. Thornton, 327 F.3d 268, 271-72 (3d Cir. 2003).  Without this 
record, “[t]he appellate court may have no way of knowing whether a seemingly unusual 
or misguided action by counsel had a sound strategic motive or was taken because the 
counsel's alternatives were even worse.”  Id. at 272 (citing Massaro v. United States, 538 
U.S. 500, 504-05 (2003)).  The exception established by United States v. Headley, 923 
F.2d 1079 (3d Cir. 1991), which allows consideration of ineffective assistance claims on 
direct appeal, requires that the record be fully developed. 
 The Headley exception does not apply here.  While Whitmer points to numerous 
ways in which he believes his appointed counsel was deficient, and identifies where in 
the record he believes those deficiencies occurred, App. Rep. Br. at 29-30, nothing in the 
record provides the factual basis needed for the court to decide whether counsel 
employed a reasonable strategy.  We therefore deny Whitmer’s claim without prejudice 
to its reassertion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 
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D. 
 Next, Whitmer claims that false information was presented to the grand jury, 
depriving the District Court of jurisdiction to hear this case.  We do not agree, because 
any objection to an infirmity in the grand jury proceedings was waived.  Appeals 
regarding the pre-plea proceedings – including constitutional issues – are waived when a 
party enters into a counseled, intelligent, and voluntary plea agreement.  E.g., Tollett v. 
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (“When a criminal defendant has solemnly 
admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he 
may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional 
rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.”).  For this reason, we need not 
evaluate the merits of Whitmer’s claim regarding false information presented to the grand 
jury.  By entering into a guilty plea, Whitmer waived his right to raise objections to 
pretrial proceedings.  This issue was therefore waived. 
E. 
Whitmer alleges additional errors around his requests to proceed pro se, the 
calculation of the sentencing guidelines, and his right of allocution.  Because we find that 
a valid appellate waiver precludes these appeals, we do not reach the merits of these 
arguments. 
An appellate wavier will not be enforced where the government has breached the 
plea agreement.  United States v. Wilson, 429 F.3d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 2005).  Because we 
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conclude that the government has not breached its agreement, we begin by considering de 
novo the enforceability of the waiver, including “(1) whether the waiver of the right to 
appeal [Whitmer’s] sentence was knowing and voluntary; (2) whether one of the specific 
exceptions set forth in the agreement prevents the enforcement of the waiver; i.e., what is 
the scope of the waiver and does it bar appellate review of the issue pressed by the 
defendant; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would work a miscarriage of justice.”  
United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 536 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. 
Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 243-44 (3d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted)). 
Here, the District Court properly assured through its questioning that Whitmer’s 
acceptance of the plea agreement was knowing and voluntary.  Whitmer’s counsel at the 
time of the plea further underscored this conclusion by stating “[Whitmer] understands 
the waiver of rights, and he’s agreed to waive his rights, and that’s why he had in fact 
executed the waiver of rights.”  Supp. App. at 126.  At the District Court’s request, 
Whitmer verbally affirmed his counsel’s statement.  Furthermore, none of the exceptions 
detailed in the agreement (i.e., claims on appeal that the sentence exceeds the statutory 
maximum, represents an upward departure from the guidelines, or imposes an 
unreasonable sentence above the guideline range as determined by the sentencing court) 
cover the errors Whitmer alleges.  Finally, we find nothing in the record suggesting that 
enforcing the waiver would work a miscarriage of justice – a standard that requires more 
than mere meritorious claims.  For these reasons, we conclude that Whitmer has waived 
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his right to appeal alleged errors related to his requests to proceed pro se, the calculation 
of the sentencing guidelines, and his allocution. 
H. 
 Finally, Whitmer claims that the District Court erred in adding a special provision 
to the terms of his release that gave the Probation Office discretion to require him to 
participate in a mental health program.  The government has elected not to assert the 
appellate waiver as to this issue, and we conclude the condition will be removed. 
 “[W]hile probation officers may have discretion to decide the details of a 
defendant's mental health treatment, they may not be given the authority to decide 
whether or not such treatment will be required.”  United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 
243 (3d Cir. 2005).  Here, although evidence from Whitmer’s psychological evaluation 
might have supported an order of mental health treatment, the District Court instead 
stated “if the Probation Department finds its appropriate – then I will allow it. . . . The 
Probation Department will have to decide that.”  This statement, coupled with the fact 
that the District Court did not refer to or rely on the psychologist’s report, leads us to 
conclude that this special condition of supervised release constituted an impermissible 
delegation of judicial authority to the Probation Department.  We will therefore order this 
condition removed. 
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IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court in part 
and will order the special condition of supervised release relating to mental health 
treatment removed. 
